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Journalism, separation, and independence: newspaper coverage of the end of the British 
Mandate for Palestine, 1948 
Introduction 
A century after the Balfour Declaration, and half a century after the Six Day War, history 
continues to have great influence over the narratives of conflict in the Middle East. As Ilan 
Pappe wrote of his experience of teaching a class, at Haifa University, which included 
Palestinian and Jewish students, ‘both groups regard history as just another prism through which 
to view present rather than past reality’ (2006: 1).  Outside the region, news reporting contributes 
to much of western understanding of the conflict – although the historical role which Britain in 
particular played in the region features less frequently in public discussion. This article will 
argue that news reporting of the end of the British Mandate is a valuable source for 
understanding the relationship between correspondents and Colonial power then, and, that 
despite both the pressures placed upon them, and their close relationship with the Colonial 
authorities, journalists achieved a degree of independence in their reporting. In doing so, the 
article will also seek to determine the nature and extent of that independence.  
By late 1947, Palestine was becoming increasingly ungovernable. Thirty years had passed since 
General Allenby took possession of Jerusalem from retreating Ottoman forces, an episode of 
British colonial history captured for global distribution using the latest technology: film 
(Colonial Film, 1917). Humbled, even as a conquering imperial hero, by the sanctity of the city, 
Allenby famously dismounted and entered on foot (Mansfield, 1992: 159). Three decades later, 
at the end of a period during which, ‘The purpose of the Mandate was never entirely clear to 
those serving in Palestine,’ (Shepherd, 1999: 5), British authority in Palestine was coming to an 
end. The final days of the Mandate were the subject of unusually extensive media scrutiny. In his 
diary, the last Chief Secretary of the Mandatory Government, Sir Henry Gurney, noted that there 
were ‘120 Palestine newspapers’ and ‘about 70 foreign correspondents who send out a continual 
stream of facts or misstatements, according to whom they get it from.’ (Golani, 2009: 70). This 
‘continual stream’ seems to have been a consequence of the fact that Mandate affairs were 
followed closely far beyond the borders of Palestine. ‘Perennially the focus of Parliamentary 
questions, journalistic scrutiny, often partisan international attention from press and politicians, 
the Mandate was never a quiet backwater, much to the chagrin of local officials.’ (Sherman, 
1997: 32). Dealing with propaganda was part of the job of Mandate officials. They also faced 
impossible competing demands from Palestine’s Jewish and Arab populations, and daily 
personal danger. Gurney’s predecessor, Sir John Shaw, had left Palestine in 1946, ‘unable to 
continue in office because he was under certain threat of assassination.’ (Golani, 2009: 4). 
Shaw’s departure followed the bombing in July 1946 of a wing of the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem, which then served as headquarters for the Mandate authorities. Ninety-one people 
were killed in the explosion (Shepherd, 1992: 225). Peter Duffield, then correspondent for The 
Daily Express, was in another part of the King David when the bombers – Jewish fighters 
seeking to drive the British from Palestine, and hasten the creation of a Jewish State – hit their 
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target. His account of the attack was carried in the next day’s newspaper, along with material – 
relating to a meeting in Shaw’s office – which had obviously been prepared before the explosion. 
Duffield picked out one detail which seemed to sum up the conflict. ‘That Palestine scene – with 
its fierce hatreds, its distortions and mutilations of the truth – is visible in Shaw’s wastepaper 
basket. Into it each day, after perusal, go thousands of words of propaganda, pleading, demands 
and threats.’ (Duffield, 1946). The extent and efficacy of this ‘perusal’ is perhaps questionable. 
As Sherman has pointed out (1997: 27), ‘Since few British officials knew Hebrew, the complex 
political and ideological controversies that agitated the Jewish community, reflected in lively 
press and public debate, were unknown to all but a few’. In terms of communication with the 
peoples of Palestine, in fact, it has been argued that the British Mandate authorities spoke more 
than they listened. ‘A discourse appealing to the desirability of uplifting social evolution via the 
technology of benevolent colonial rule and industrial capitalism was deployed mercilessly and 
aggressively.’ (Ghandour, 2010: 3).  
The present article considers some 50 news and other items from newspapers published on or 
around May 14th 1948. The Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, and The Observer  were the 
main British newspapers selected, partly because their use of bylines – not then a universal 
convention – allowed the work of individual correspondents, especially Clare Hollingworth, to 
be followed. The Manchester Guardian and The Times were also considered, although are cited 
less here principally because their lack of bylines meant journalists’ work could not be traced in 
the same way. The New York Times was selected for its long tradition of international reporting 
in order to provide contrasting perspectives – not only politically, but also, as will be 
demonstrated, because its correspondents enjoyed better access than their British counterparts.  
The correspondents’ world: colonialism, and Orientalism?  
Like journalists in any age, the correspondents in Palestine then were surrounded by factors 
which were potential influences on their reporting. The wider global political situation is 
significant. This was the period immediately following the Second World War, during which 
‘political leaders were gratified by how uncomplainingly editors, reporters and film-makers lent 
their talents to the war effort’ (Caruthers, 2011: 90), and when ‘BBC Staff felt themselves to be 
in the front line,’ (Briggs, 1985: 194). Given their proximity to the colonial elite – one thing 
which comes through the coverage of the bombing of the King David Hotel is the number of 
reporters, in addition to Duffield, who were themselves nearly killed or injured – the 
correspondents shared some of the dangers which officials faced, and so may have come to share 
their viewpoints. Views of the inhabitants of the Holy Land then were not necessarily 
antagonistic, but nor were they always realistic. ‘Upon the Arabs of Palestine […] the British 
tended to project expectations and feelings absorbed largely from a romantic literary tradition of 
Orientalism,’ wrote Sherman (1997: 25).  Certainly, his Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 
1918-48 provides plenty of material to support his statement. Yet the Orientalism of the Mandate 
was more than that ‘romantic literary tradition’. In as much as they thought of it at all, the 
correspondents then would have understood Orientalism to signify, in addition to that artistic and 
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literary genre, ‘the scholarly study of the languages and cultures of ‘the Orient’: a geographically 
nebulous region comprising North Africa and the present-day Middle East, ranging through 
South Asia and extending as far east as Japan.’ (Teo, 2013: 2). Today, any assessment of the 
word must include discussion of Edward Said’s Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient 
(1978), and later writings – especially such characterizations as, ‘What we must reckon with is a 
long and slow process of appropriation by which Europe, or the European awareness of the 
Orient, transformed itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, 
economic, and even military.’ (1995:  210). The British Mandate for Palestine was obviously one 
of the latter cases. The correspondents were naturally expected to follow the activities of the 
political and military leadership of the Mandate. In other words, they and their reporting were 
part of the ‘administrative, economic, even military’ construct which was the British Mandate for 
Palestine. Orientalism, therefore, provides in some respects a useful way of characterizing the 
body of British correspondents’ work in Palestine in this period. However, it is not a complete 
explanation. To this theoretical approach must be added a recognition of practical factors: 
particularly language barriers, and physical ones of access. Nor were these factors for British 
reporters alone. They may have been allowed into Irgun news conferences from which British 
correspondents were banned, but life was not all easy for correspondents from the United States 
either. A footnote to a Daily Express article from the time reported, ‘Transjordan has warned the 
U.S. government that no visas will be given to American correspondents because it cannot be 
responsible for their safety.’ (Footnote to Grey,1947).  
The day after the bombing of the King David, Barbara Board, of the Daily Mirror , told readers 
of the way a military policeman at the hotel entrance had thrown her to the ground and  shielded 
her with his body. (Board, 1946). The correspondents were there too when British soldiers dug 
through the rubble in search of survivors, and dead. ‘In broad daylight, dozens of Jews, Arabs, 
and Britishers, were murdered in cold blood by the notorious Jewish terrorist organization, Irgun 
Zvai Leumi’ ran the commentary on a contemporary newsreel. (Imperial War Museum Films, 
1946). Having themselves been in personal danger, the journalists may well have been more 
likely to identify with the colonial officials who were the target of the attack. Another 
correspondent, Clare Hollingworth, could not overcome her anger even decades later. One of the 
group behind the bombing, Menachem Begin, was a future Israeli Prime Minister. ‘When Begin 
rose to power in the late 1970s I often found myself in his presence. But I never greeted him. I 
would not shake a hand with so much blood on it,’ she wrote in a later memoir (1990: 141). Such 
a response is understandable, given the danger in which Hollingworth had found herself. It also 
casts doubt on the efficacy of part of the Irgun’s strategy, given that, ‘Much of the terrorist 
campaign of the Irgun was directed at the British media. Begin himself recognised the 
importance of that factor in the various meetings of the High Command.’ (Zadka, 1995: 178). In 
the King David attack, ‘the terrorist campaign’ seems, if anything, to have driven the British 
press into the arms of the Mandate authorities: in Board’s case, literally so.  
 
The importance of the press 
 
Yet there were divisions between the political elite and the correspondents. Close as they may 
have been in outlook, and in physical location, the journalists were also kept at a distance – even 
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as their potential power was understood. In his diary entry of 5th April 1948, just weeks before 
the Mandate was to come to an end, Gurney recorded the fact that The Times was to run a piece 
on a new book, published by the British Government’s Stationery Office. The book included 
‘admirable pictures and photographs’ of ‘the Holy City under British care.’ (Golani, 2009: 87). 
That ‘care’ may have been about to stop. The way in which it was to be portrayed retained great 
importance. Indeed, the ‘administrative, economic, even military’ aspects of the British Mandate 
were complemented by what were probably then cutting-edge public relations techniques. On 
Gurney’s staff, as Public Information Officer, was Richard ‘Dick’ Stubbs ‘previously advertising 
manager for Bob Martin’s condition powder’ (Golani, 2009: 200) – a preparation then, as now, 
designed to keep pet dogs in top shape. Even with Stubbs’ assistance, Gurney admitted, ‘It’s not 
easy to follow what’s going on.’ (Golani, 2009: 70) This led him to compare his own access to 
information with the task facing the press, in terms that suggest a degree of admiration, ‘even 
when you have access to all the information there is, but these fellows have to go out and get it 
for themselves.’ (Golani, 2009: 70). This is not within this article’s main scope, but his use of the 
word ‘fellows’ is interesting for what it says about gender attitudes in that milieu at that time – 
especially given that two of the most prominent correspondents, Board and Hollingworth, were 
women.  
 
If one can detect among the British political elite in Palestine an understanding of the importance 
of press coverage, and even a degree of respect, then it is not always returned. Those who had ‘to 
go out and get it for themselves’ could be scathing of those who did not. At one point, Gurney 
wrote that Duffield had complained that the assistance offered by Stubbs’ Public Information 
Office had made some reporters’ lives too easy (Golani, 2009: 70). Hollingworth and her 
colleagues – although perhaps not those whom Duffield all but accused of laziness – did want to 
try to find out what is going on. Throughout her career, starting with her famously (and 
correctly) reporting in August 1939 – when she was herself ‘only three days into [her] first 
journalism job’ (Garrett, 2015: 67) – German armoured divisions on the Polish border, and 
poised to invade, Hollingworth was one to get the story herself. In Palestine, it was the sheer 
difficulty of doing so which frustrated her. In her article published in The Observer on 11th April 
1948, she explained why. The opening of her piece included a line, ‘It is the first time in history 
that shells have landed in the Holy City,’ designed, as the best reportage should be, to gain, and 
retain, the audience’s attention. As the piece continued, she reflected on the difficulty of 
establishing what was happening. Having apparently reached a dead end in her quest for ‘hard’ 
facts, Hollingworth turned her ire on those who, she obviously felt, should have been providing 
more reliable information. 
The sound of gunfire was audible all over the centre of Jerusalem, and shells fell within two 
miles of the Dome of the Rock Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Before the 
shelling began, the only ‘hard’ facts of a situation which daily becomes more obscure and 
confused were that the Arabs this morning retook Mount Castel and that there was heavy 
fighting along the western approaches to Jerusalem – the only possible entry into the city for 
Jewish traffic.  
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There is no longer the slightest reliance to be placed in Jewish reports. Their Press is under 
strict censorship, imposed and enforced by the Jewish Agency, and its misrepresentations and 
distortions are reaching astonishing heights. There is indeed an atmosphere of quite 
unbelievable reality in the Jewish approach to the situation, which is based upon the 
determination to maintain at all costs the illusion that it is impossible for Jews to lose in any 
encounter with Arabs.  
On the Arab side the Press indulges in childish boasting and highly-coloured accounts of 
Arab victories while what must be termed “official Arab sources” simply do not know what 
is happening, as their means of communication and collection and collation of data are 
hopelessly inadequate.  
Unfortunately, the British authorities police and military, who might be expected to provide 
at least a check upon the prevailing exaggerations, appear usually to be in the position of 
having to obtain their information from the Press. They never know anything more.  
Hollingworth’s piece has been quoted some length here because it illustrates at least two 
important points about the significance of the newspaper coverage of the end of the British 
Mandate for Palestine. This, surely, was journalistic independence in text form. Hollingworth did 
not feel she owed anything to any of her potential sources. On the contrary, she felt that they 
were failing her, and, by extension, her readers. With the exception of their access to British 
officials (and Gurney’s reflection that he, unlike the journalists, had ‘access to all the information 
there is’ suggests that was probably of limited scope and value) the correspondents were at a 
distance from the people whose lives and conflicts they were covering. Perhaps one can therefore 
also read a degree of frustration into Hollingworth’s criticism of British officials who ‘appear 
usually to be in the position of having to obtain their information from the Press’. Just as they 
seem to be at a distance from what is going on, so are the correspondents. In the fifty or so news 
reports which formed the core of the research for this article, one looks in vain for any reflection 
of Arab or Jewish opinion other than that offered by official sources. Whatever one might think 
of later 20th century, and 21st century, reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it is now 
more readily known (and some scholars, such as Philo and Berry (2004, 2011) have been deeply 
critical of it), this seems striking. The reporting at this time seems removed from the people, 
Jewish and Arab, of Palestine. The human interest stories of the café owner, school teacher, 
farmer, or casual labourer, which might today be expected to provide context, or even a 
superficial indication of public opinion, are absent. Where are the casual contacts – the taxi 
drivers, the shopkeepers, with whom western correspondents might now chat? Where are the 
academics, the religious leaders, from whom they might seek more nuanced understanding of, or 
elite opinion from within, the communities which they were covering?  
 
Their absence might tend to support an interpretation suggesting that western reporters had, at 
least in part, an Orientalist approach to the story, in the sense employed by Said.  ‘Orientals were 
rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed (sic) not as citizens, or even people, 
but as problems to be solved or – as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory – taken 
over.’ (1995: 207. In considering whether this was the case, it proved instructive to look at some 
of the work which Hollingworth in particular published on other assignments. Hollingworth’s 
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reporting was selected because of the range of other stories which she covered during the period 
shortly before and after the end of the British Mandate for Palestine. Duffield, Broad, and others, 
such as O’Dowd Gallagher of the Daily Mail, who were also reporting from Palestine in this era, 
did not travel as extensively as she. This is understandable. Given the huge amount of editorial 
appetite for coverage of Palestine, they had little incentive to do so. Hollingworth, on the other 
hand, seems to have been more restless. Even a brief examination of her work for The Observer 
in 1948 and 1949 uncovers datelines in Greece, Egypt, and Yugoslavia. Her work from these 
locations displays, in addition to her versatility as a correspondent, a frequent reliance on elite 
sources. There is one important distinction. The sources to which Hollingworth had access in 
other locations seemed very well informed – at least, that is the impression given from the detail 
in which she is able to report either the purge of the Secret Police in Yugoslavia (Hollingworth, 
1948c) or the diet of the dying Greek Prime Minister (Hollingworth, 1948d). The lack of access 
to detailed, reliable, information she experienced in Palestine explains the frustration she 
expressed in the article cited above – and also why her reporting, and that of her fellow 
correspondents, sometimes feels removed from the action. 
 
Security, an issue which will be discussed in more detail below, may have been another factor in 
this sense of separation. A week after the British authorities quit Mandate Palestine, Richard 
Wyndham, a reporter for Kemsley newspapers, was killed in the Sheikh Jarrah district, on the 
approaches to the Old City of Jerusalem (Daily Express News Service, 1948). We should not 
forget that Board, Duffield, and Hollingworth had all personally been uncomfortably close to the 
bombing of the King David Hotel. Hollis (2016: 10) has described the end of the Mandate as a 
time when the British political elite in Palestine were antagonistic to, and felt antagonized by, the 
peoples whom they were supposed to govern. ‘Both communities were criticised in language that 
patronised the Arabs and demonised the Jews, as these British servants of the empire began to 
realise that they themselves were increasingly the objects of hostility from both quarters.’ The 
reporting reflects a similar detachment, and, certainly in the case of Hollingworth, rigorously 
expressed disdain. So while Orientalist (in the sense employed by Said) perspectives formed part 
of the relationship between western reporters and the peoples whose conflict they were covering, 
there were additional factors: security, access, and probably language, too. Sherman’s point, 
cited above, about the lack of Hebrew skills among British officials presumably applied equally 
to western correspondents.  
 
The second point about Hollingworth’s 11th April, 1948 article worthy of more detailed 
discussion here is the attempts which the belligerents make to mislead correspondents. Using 
phrases such as ‘misrepresentations and distortions’ and ‘childish boasting and highly-coloured 
accounts’ (Hollingworth 1948a), Hollingworth, frustrated as she was by the dearth of ‘“hard” 
facts’ at least made it clear to her readers that she was not taken in by the information she had 
been fed. Although attempts to influence coverage, especially coverage of armed conflict, are as 
old as war reporting itself, these attempts to mislead are especially significant given what has 
followed. There can be few languages which have a single word for ‘public diplomacy’ in the 
sense of trying to influence public opinion. Hebrew is an exception. The word hasbara  defies 
straightforward translation, but definitely includes this concept. ‘There is no English word. It’s 
either public diplomacy or information, some would say indoctrination,’ is the explanation 
offered by Nitzan Chen, current Head of the Israeli Government Press Office (cited in Rodgers, 
2015: 119). Judging from Hollingworth’s experience, this is where that ‘indoctrination’, or 
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attempt at the same, begins to establish itself: ready to grow in scope and sophistication as the 
State of Israel itself develops, right up to the age of social media (see Kuntsman and Stein, 
2015). Hollingworth’s experience has its counterparts in every era of the coverage of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In 1967, for example, David Hirst, the veteran Middle East correspondent 
who was then a young stringer based in Beirut, wrote, ‘There are two wars – the real war and 
propaganda war.’ (Hirst, 1967). His article went on to describe ‘fierce rhetoric pouring in’ from 
Arab radio stations, and ‘Arabic counterblast from Israel’ (Hirst, 1967) – the Jewish State, then 
not even two decades old, already adept and using the language of its foes to fight the media 
battle. If this process of Arab-Israeli propaganda war did not exactly begin in 1948, 
Hollingworth’s experience shows that it was at a highly significant point during the last days of 
the British Mandate – already established as one of the enduring elements of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the journalist which chronicles it.  
 
Distance, discourse, and danger 
 
The coverage of the massacre at Deir Yassin on April 9 1948 – a month before the Mandate 
came to an end – is significant for what it tells us about Jewish armed groups’ attempts to restrict 
and shape international reporting, and the kind of reporting which resulted. In recent decades, the 
State of Israel and the Israeli Army have been in charge of issuing, through the Government 
Press Office (GPO), journalist accreditation, and controlling access based upon whether or not 
the journalist in question holds a GPO card. In the conflict in Gaza in 2008-9, known as 
‘Operation Cast Lead’, the Israeli Authorities actually banned international journalists from 
entering Gaza for the duration of their campaign in the territory. The decision was reversed after 
the Foreign Press Association, which represents journalists employed by international news 
organizations to report from Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, successfully took the government 
to court. (FPA News, 2009). It is understandable that the Israeli Authorities might wish to keep 
international correspondents away. The British Mandate authorities had closer contact with 
British members of the international press corps than is the case today with the Israeli 
government and correspondents from outside the country. That does not mean that the 
correspondents of the Mandate era enjoyed unrestricted access, or that they universally shared 
the political and military authorities’ outlook – consider Hollingworth’s questioning of their 
competence; Duffield’s frustration at what he saw as the easy life the Public Information Office 
afforded to his competitors. Gurney’s reflections on the press seem to mirror those of military 
men in difficult situations throughout modern history: an annoying necessity whose needs must 
be considered. By the final weeks of the Mandate, however, British authority in Palestine had 
dwindled to an extent that being a British correspondent, or being accredited to the Public 
Information Office, was not sufficient to grant reporters the kind of access which they needed to 
do their job.  
 
The massacre at the village of Deir Yassin is a case in point. The killing there of some 250 
villagers (Khalidi, 1992: 290) on April 9 1948 was described by Gurney in his diary as ‘one of 
the worst things the Irgun and Stern1 have done’ (Golani, 2009: 111). Even Harry Levin, a 
journalist working then for the illegal radio station run by the Haganah (a Jewish military 
organization set up during the Mandate era2) seems to have been horrified by what he heard. 
‘Last night Etzel3 captured Deir Yassin. Appalling accounts are circulating of their 
indiscriminate killing of men, women, and children. The entire purpose of the operation is 
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questionable.’ (Levin: 1997: 57). Gurney himself is in the dark as to the details of what has 
happened. The British correspondents are, too. The Times correspondent, Gurney writes, is 
unable to reach Deir Yassin, ‘stopped by the Haganah’ (Golani, 2009: 111). Further, remarkable, 
indication of the conditions under which British correspondents were working appeared in the 
next day’s edition of The Times. Not only had the paper’s correspondent been prevented from 
reaching Deir Yassin. Two paragraphs of a Reuters despatch carried in the paper on April 10th 
reported that Irgun and Stern leaders had actually organized a news conference ‘outside 
Jerusalem’ the night before – a news conference at which they ‘claimed they had killed 200 
Arabs – half of whom were women and children’ (Reuters, 1948). However, ‘Only American 
and Jewish correspondents were admitted to the Press conference, the British being banned as 
“untrustworthy”.’ (Reuters, 1948). The reasons why the British journalists are seen in this way 
are not given, but it might be reasonable to assume that those giving the news conference feared 
being identified, and subsequently arrested – and that they did not ‘trust’ British correspondents 
to deliver the kind of coverage they sought. The Reuters despatch suggests a great deal of 
confidence, an air even of being untouchable, on the part of the ‘Irgun Commander’. The fact 
that the commander is quoted as saying that ‘the main Jewish assault on Arab-held territory 
would not begin until after the British withdrawal’ (Reuters, 1948) makes clear that the Irgun 
feel free to say what they like without fear of British reprisal. With the Mandate so clearly on its 
last legs, the days when ‘much of the terrorist campaign’ needed to be ‘directed at the British 
media’ (Zadka, 1995: 178) were over. A reading of the New York Times’ report, however, 
suggests that there may still have been an element of security consciousness, too. 
The report, by Dana Adams Schmidt, appeared in the New York Times on 10th April 1948, under 
the headline, ‘200 Arabs killed, Stronghold Taken’. The massacre is infamous to this day for the 
number of civilians killed. It is also a turning point in the history of Jewish Militant groups’ 
involvement in the conflict of the late Mandate era. As Schmidt wrote, ‘This engagement marked 
the formal entry of the Irgunists and Sternists into the battle against the Arabs. Previously both 
groups had concentrated against the British.’ (Adams Schmidt, 1948). The most telling 
paragraphs from the point of view of the access afforded to Adams Schmidt and others appear 
lower down the piece, under the crosshead ‘Victors Describe Battle’ 
The Irgunists and Sternists escorted a party of United States correspondents to a house at 
Givat Shaul, near Deir Yasin (sic), tonight and offered them tea and cookies and amplified 
details of the operation.  
The spokesman said that the village had become a concentration point for Arabs, including 
Syrian and Iraqi (sic), planning to attack the western suburbs of Jerusalem. If, as he expected, 
the Haganah took over occupation of the village, it would help to cover the convoy route 
from the coast.  
The spokesman said he regretted the casualties among the women and children at Deir Yasin 
but asserted that they were inevitable because every house had to be reduced by force. Ten 
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houses were blown up. At others the attackers blew open the doors and threw in hand 
grenades.  
One hundred men in four groups attacked a 4:30 o’clock in the morning, the spokesman said. 
The Irgunists wore uniforms of a secret design and they used automatic weapons and rifles. 
(Adams Schmidt, 1948). 
The perpetrators of the killings at Deir Yassin did keep some details to themselves: their  
identities, for one. These were not for publication. Throughout Adams Schmidt’s report, he 
refers to the speaker as ‘the spokesman’. No name or description appears. Adams Schmidt’s 
report, based on access denied to his British counterparts, is a kind of masterpiece of extreme 
journalistic objectivity. As such, it serves to highlight what can go wrong when correspondents 
adhere so strictly to such an approach. It excludes any reflection, or speculation, upon the 
suffering endured by the inhabitants of the village as their attackers fell upon them. While the 
headline writers have picked out the death toll, Adams Schmidt’s report saves it for the end of 
the first paragraph, which concludes ‘the Jews killed more than 200 Arabs, half of them women 
and children.’ (Adams Schmidt, 1948). To be fair to Adams Schmidt, it is impossible to know at 
this distance whether the number of dead was placed at the end of the paragraph by editors in 
New York, perhaps on the grounds that the figure appeared prominently in the headline. The 
matter-of-fact tone of the rest of his report suggests that he may genuinely not have considered it 
the top line of the story. The word of ‘the spokesman’ is taken at face value. Nothing in the 
report suggests that Adams Schmidt or his colleagues challenged the spokesman, or asked for an 
explanation. Nor is the fact that the attack began at ‘4.30 o’clock in the morning’ (Adams 
Schmidt, 1948) commented upon. It may help to explain why only ‘some’ of the ‘women and 
children’ who were told to ‘take refuge in the caves’ (presumably adjacent to the village) 
apparently did so.  
Adams Schmidt’s report is memorable for the fact that it brought news of the massacre to a 
wider audience. Its indifference to the fate of those killed, and its readiness to convey 
unchallenged the spokesman’s words as he seeks to justify the deaths of civilians, make it stand 
out in another way, too – even decades later. No attempt is made to put a human face on those 
killed. Throughout, they are simply ‘Arabs’ or, as Said (1995: 207) might have seen it, ‘Orientals 
[….] seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people.’ In common with the British 
correspondents, Adams Schmidt may have found it impossible to get to Deir Yassin itself 
(although his reporting from around the time of the massacre does not mention any attempt to do 
so), but he did at least have access to sources in the way that the British correspondents 
obviously did not. He, along with his American colleagues, was trusted by the Jewish militant 
groups to the extent that they shared information with them, albeit apparently on entirely their 
own terms. In terms of the close relationship between Israel and the United States which was to 
follow later in the 20th century, and into our own, it is interesting to note the Jewish militant 
groups’ attempts, even on the eve of Israeli statehood, to favour American correspondents with 
privileged access.  
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Given the Jewish militant groups’ antagonistic approach to the British press, it seems less 
surprising that the correspondents seem at a distance from those they are covering. They lack 
contacts in the circles which would help them to understand in more detail what is happening. In 
this case they are distanced from the peoples of Palestine not because of an Orientalist barrier. 
They are distanced because, whatever efforts they might make to try to find out what is 
happening, physical obstacles are put in their way.  
That is not to say such barriers of discourse did not exist in the coverage at the time. At the end 
of the previous year, 1947, when the timescale for British withdrawal from Palestine was first 
being outlined – ‘Large-scale evacuation of British troops and officials from Palestine will begin 
early in January,’ (Daily Mirror, 1947), as the Mirror put it in early December of that year – the 
British correspondents’ distance from the story seems more marked. Writing in the Daily 
Express a couple of days later, Eric Grey gave an account of unrest in Jerusalem 
British troops barricaded the King David Hotel: the civil and military headquarters. Arab 
youths fought it out with Palestine Police who used armoured cars to bar them from the 
Jewish quarters.  
Then 200 Jewish youths carrying cudgels marched out, looking for trouble. Police 
reinforcements were called to keep the rival mobs apart. (Grey, 1947).  
Grey’s story was datelined ‘Jerusalem’, but the source of his information is not clear. His 
reference to British troops barricading the King David Hotel (despite the bombing of the year 
before, the building did remain the British ‘civil and military headquarters’ right up until the end 
of the Mandate) suggests that he may have been there, or at least seen the troops protecting the 
hotel. The lack of descriptive detail of the barricade; the ‘Arab youths’; or the ‘Jewish youths’ 
however, suggests that Grey may have been elsewhere, and based his story based on official 
statements. That lack of detail in this incident, as in Deir Yassin, suggests a combination of 
factors shaping the reporting.  
Whatever the shortcomings of the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in this century, it is 
very difficult to imagine that were a massacre of this scale to take place today, there would not 
be at least some attempt to find survivors, or relatives of those killed, to put a human face on 
such a horrific story. Criticizing T. E. Lawrence (often known as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’) for the 
way he describes the Arabs among whom he lives and alongside whom he fights, Said writes 
We are to assume that if an Arab feels joy, if he is sad at the death of his child or parent, if he 
has a sense of the injustices of political tyranny, then those experiences are necessarily 
subordinate to the sheer, unadorned, and persistent fact of being an Arab (1995: 230) (Italics 
in original).  
Said was not writing about the way British correspondents covered the people among whom they 
were staying, but his words here, especially those about being ‘sad at the death of his child or his 
11 
 
parent’, seem apt – as do his words on the work of Gertrude Bell ‘about life in Damascus’ (Said, 
1995: 229). Said suggests that Bell’s words ‘wipe out any trace of individual Arabs with 
narratable life stories.’ (Said, 1995: 229). The same could be said of some of the reporting of the 
end of the British Mandate.  
Days of change, transition, and reflection 
By the time of the massacre at Deir Yassin, the British Mandate had only a few weeks to run. 
The words attributed to the ‘Irgun Commander’ at the press conference following the killings 
show that Jewish militant groups were already forming strategy based on what they might be 
able to achieve ‘after the British withdrawal’. When that came, the British newspapers provided 
coverage which combined various elements of patriotic pride. These ranged from justification of 
British control of Palestine, and a cataloguing of achievements, to concern for the future. On the 
morning of May 14th 1948, the Daily Mirror’s story was headlined ‘Palestine – last appeal as we 
quit’ (Daily Mirror, 1948). Under the crossheading ‘Underdeveloped’, the paper reported that  
When British rule began, says the Colonial Office, Palestine was primitive and 
underdeveloped. 
The population of 750, 000 were disease-ridden and poor. But new methods of farming were 
introduced, medical services provided, roads and railways built, water supplies improved, 
malaria wiped out. (Daily Mirror, 1948) 
Given that the British departure was to herald Palestine’s descent to an even greater intensity of 
armed conflict, there was a motive to seek out the positive, the achievements. The British 
investment in terms of blood and treasure had, after all, been significant – and many of those 
directly involved, or their families, would have been reading the Mirror and other papers. As the 
story points out in the next paragraph, ‘We had 84, 000 troops in Palestine.’ (Daily Mirror, 
1948a). The number is astonishing, especially when the current strength of the British Army is 
considered for comparison.4 Little wonder, then, that Palestine was such a story. If there was any 
sense of weariness, failure, or futility, the British Newspapers were generally keen to keep a lid 
on it. The coverage of the very end of the Mandate tended to focus instead on the disorder which 
followed. In the Daily Mirror  of May 15th, ‘The Jews claimed to have won control of Jerusalem 
after house-to-house fighting.’ (Daily Mirror, 1948b). On the coast, Eric Grey reported for the 
Daily Express on an Egyptian air-raid, apparently aimed indiscriminately at civilians, part of the 
assault by Arab armies which meant that, ‘Israel was thus born in the midst of war.’ (Shlaim, 
2000: 34).  
Egyptian spitfires dive-bombed a bus station in the heart of Tel-Aviv at the rush hour this 
evening. Forty-one people including children were killed, and more than 60 wounded.  
I watched two planes come in from the sea and circle at 10,000 feet. 
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Then with a three-minute interval between them, they dived to 500 feet, dropped four small 
bombs – and started machine-gunning. Their green markings could be seen.  
Those three minutes saved many lives: they gave hundreds of people a chance to take cover. 
Two bombs dropped near a long queue waiting for suburban buses. One fell right on the 
station building.  
Several buses were shattered, and the road was strewn with dead and wounded.  
Until tonight the raids have not been taken seriously. The city thought it was a joke when 
four Jewish girls captured an Egyptian pilot shot down this morning. (Grey, 1948) 
Alongside this kind of coverage – these dramatic accounts of armed conflict, albeit with the 
moment of levity, when the inhabitants of Tel Aviv thought the air raids ‘a joke’ – another theme 
is also present: that of a sense of an end of a chapter of British imperial history. In the Daily 
Express on May 15th, Sydney Smith encapsulates this moment and the conflict which erupts in 
its wake. He describes British officials taking their leave, ‘the Union Jack was hauled down at 
Government House and a Red Cross flag took its place. Hardly had they left when the Arabs and 
Jews resumed their battle for Jerusalem.’ (Smith, 1948). Compare this account of a battle with 
the apparently calm and dignified surroundings into which the same flag arrived in London only 
a few hours later (brought by plane, ahead of many officials, who made the journey by sea) 
The weather-beaten, sun-dried Union Jack which was lowered for the last time from British 
Headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem early yesterday was carried in the airways 
terminal building at Victoria, S.W. at 12.45 am today.  
The flag, symbol of the end of the British mandate, was tucked under the arm of Mr Maurice 
Dornan, Under-Secretary for Administration in Palestine.  
With the last party of officials to leave Jerusalem – led by sir Henry Gurney, Chief Secretary 
– they had just flown to England.  
The Daily Mail reporter in Haifa cabling last night said that as General Sir Alan 
Cunningham, last High Commissioner, left Jerusalem a solitary piper played on the roof of 
Government House.  
Sir Alan flew to Haifa then drove to the port through heavily guarded streets.  
Sir Alan stepped into a naval barge, saluted and sped to the cruiser Euryalus, while two 
flights of Spitfires dipped low over the water. (Daily Mail, 1948). 
The Daily Mirror added more detail, again designed to emphasize the sense of imperial history. 
The paper reported that Mr Maurice Dorman, the official who carried the flag on arrival in 
London, had ‘climbed on to the tower (i.e. of the King David Hotel) and hauled down the flag.’ 
The report added, ‘Sir Henry Gurney said “The withdrawal from Jerusalem was done in an 
orderly and proud manner”’. (Daily Mirror, 1948b).  
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What followed was neither orderly, nor something of which to be proud.  
The British were supposed to bear responsibility for preserving law and order until midnight, 
May 14, 1948; on several occasions they defended Jewish settlements and neighborhoods 
(sic), among them the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. They did not, however, 
attempt to prevent the advance of the Haganah or the flight and expulsion of the Arabs. 
(Segev, 2000: 512) 
Conclusion 
‘The flight and expulsion of the Arabs,’ is still, almost seven decades later, one of the issues 
which enrages Palestinians, and to which no just or lasting solution has been found. As Said 
argued in an essay first published in Western Newspapers in 1998 (on the 50th anniversary of the 
end of the Mandate, and the coming into being of the State of Israel), ‘What makes it especially 
galling for Palestinians is that they have been forced to watch the transformation of their own 
homeland into a Western state, one of whose express purposes is to provide for Jews and not for 
non-Jews.’ (Said, 2000: 268). If the way in which the Mandate ended, or even the fact that it 
existed at all, is rarely discussed in Britain now, it is not forgotten in the region. If they did not 
know that, correspondents travelling there to report on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are often 
reminded.  The experience of Channel 4 News’ Paul Mason, in the summer of 2014, was fairly 
typical: ‘As a Brit in Gaza, “it’s all your fault”, is a line I’ve heard a lot,’ (Mason, 2014). The 
end of the Mandate was reported extensively at the time it happened; remembered by journalists 
in this decade only in blog entries, rather than in mainstream news outlets. The correspondents 
who covered the end of the Mandate cannot be blamed for the relative obscurity of an era which 
helped to shape the modern Middle East. For they did manage, within the restraints placed upon 
them both by discourse and physical danger, to convey a sense of what was happening; of the 
longer term trends in the region. For that reason, their work merits re-reading today – especially 
as the greatest challenges they identify remain unsolved. 
Decrying the departure from Jerusalem of Cable and Wireless (the company whose 
communications she used to send her stories) Hollingworth concluded ‘an important British 
interest has been needlessly sacrificed. There is little doubt that the Jewish State will build itself 
up commercially at considerable speed and provide the United States with a firm foothold in the 
Middle East.’ (Hollingworth, 1948b). Once again, Hollingworth knew what she was talking 
about – not only observant but prescient: foreseeing Washington’s rise to become the dominant 
outside power in the region for the remainder of the 20th century. Had there a prize for 
journalism on the end of the Mandate, though, it should probably have gone to the Manchester 
Guardian’s editorial dated 15th May 1948. Interested readers may wish to seek it out in its 
entirety, but one extract will suffice to show how succinctly it diagnosed the condition in which 
Britain was leaving Palestine 
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The promise to favour “the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish 
people” without prejudice to “the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine” led us straight to the terrible conflict which is now being settled by 
the blood of Jews and Arabs. (Manchester Guardian, 1948).  
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Notes  
                                                          
1
 The Stern Gang was a splinter group from the Irgun (Irgun Zvai Leumi) dedicated to violence as a means of 
achieving Jewish statehood 
 
2
 For details of its founding, see Segev (2000: 209) 
3
 The Hebrew initials of the Irgun (see Segev: 2000: 384) 
4
 A British Government website in October 2014 gave the number of personnel in the British Army as 89,200. 
Please see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/373115/af-
quarterly_personnel_report_oct14.pdf . Accessed 27 February 2017.  
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